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ABSTRACT—The commercial speech doctrine has long weathered 
accusations that it is simply an attempt to reinvigorate the laissez-faire 
protections provided by Lochner v. New York. The modern interpretation of 
Lochner is generally condemnatory, arguing that its “right to contract” is a 
symbol of the Supreme Court’s unprincipled decision to impose its own 
economic preferences upon the nation. Even though Lochnerism itself has 
been dead for nearly 100 years, some scholars believe that the First 
Amendment’s commercial speech doctrine is on its way to replicating the 
defenses provided by the right to contract. The argument goes that because 
speech pervades essentially all human conduct, including market 
transactions, the constitutional protection of free speech could serve to 
invalidate any attempts at regulating the commercial sphere, just like the 
right to contract did. But these scholars miss a crucial point: unlike the right 
to contract, the First Amendment’s ambit is necessarily restricted to pure 
speech. Accordingly, the commercial speech doctrine simply lacks the tools 
to serve the same role as the right to contract. In truth, Lochner is only a 
boogeyman when it comes to commercial speech; although there are 
certainly important discussions to be had about commercial speech, they 
must be centered on First Amendment principles, not the ominous ghost of 
Lochnerism. This Note seeks to draw that line once and for all. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Advertisements pervade the modern world. Few forums, from mobile 
games,1 to rivers in bustling cities,2 to NBA stars’ jerseys,3 have been left 
untouched by commercial speakers’ efforts to sell more products and 
services. The First Amendment addresses these forms of speech through 
what is known as the commercial speech doctrine. Broadly viewed by the 
Supreme Court as “expression advocating purchase,”4 commercial speech 
has seen an explosion in its constitutional pedigree over the past fifty years: 
during that time it has gone from no coverage,5 to limited coverage,6 to 
ostensibly complete coverage under the First Amendment.7 Supporters of the 
 
 1 See Ivan Guzenko, It’s Interactive, It’s Engaging, It’s AI-Powered: Mobile Advertising 2019, Are 
You There Yet?, CLICKZ (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.clickz.com/mobile-advertising-2019/228189 
[https://perma.cc/BJ92-XPZH]. 
 2 Colby Hamilton, Floating ‘Eyesores’ Are Illegal Advertisements, City Suit Claims, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 
27, 2019, 3:19 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/03/27/floating-eyesores-are-illegal-
advertisements-city-suit-claims [https://perma.cc/MK7N-TWJM]. 
 3 Luke Adams, Thunder Become Final NBA Team to Secure Jersey Sponsor, YARDBARKER  
(Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.yardbarker.com/nba/articles/thunder_become_final_nba_team_to_secure_ 
jersey_sponsor/s1_14822_28646324 [https://perma.cc/GH2B-RM9F]. 
 4 Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of 
Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. Rev. 67, 73–76 (2007) (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. 
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366–68 (2002)). 
 5 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 6 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. 
 7 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 
552, 565 (2011). 
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commercial speech doctrine have long championed the importance of 
providing the public with information that might affect their decision-
making in the commercial world.8 Thus, to them, the recent expansions of 
the commercial speech doctrine are consistent with the values inherent in the 
First Amendment.9 
But that doctrine is under fire. Its critics—Supreme Court Justices and 
contemporary scholars alike—believe that as soon as the First Amendment 
wholly protects commercial speech, economic legislation as the country 
knows it will crumble.10 Indeed, so profound are their concerns that they 
bring out one of legal scholarship’s most potent weapons: the infamous case 
of Lochner v. New York.11 Lochner, decided in 1905, is widely criticized 
today.12 The case grew out of a desire in the early twentieth century to 
promote laissez-faire economics; however, nothing in the Constitution 
explicitly says the market must be free of governmental interference.13 
During the so-called Lochner Era, the Court thus turned toward the Due 
Process Clause, ultimately concluding that its provision guaranteeing 
“liberty” implicitly includes the right—the liberty—to contract.14 This 
constitutional theory was dubbed “economic substantive due process,” and 
it allowed the Court to strike down a substantial number of regulations aimed 
at reining in the free market.15 
Since the late 1930s, however, the Court has recognized that economic 
substantive due process results in a blatant usurpation of the legislature’s 
law-making role.16 In truth, the doctrine ignores the clear procedural drive of 
the Due Process Clause since it invalidates any and all laws relating to 
contractual relationships, even if they were passed in accordance with proper 
 
 8 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 630 (1982) 
(“[I]nformation and opinion about competing commercial products and services undoubtedly aid the 
individual in making countless life-affecting decisions, and therefore can be seen as fostering . . . the self-
realization value.”). 
 9 See id. 
 10 See, e.g., Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 591–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, 
Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 
2016 WIS. L. REV. 133. 
 11 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 12 See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 13 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). 
 14 See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). 
 15 See infra Section I.A. 
 16 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2615–16 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting) 
(describing Lochner as a “discredited decision[]” that symbolizes “the unprincipled tradition of judicial 
policymaking”). 
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procedure.17 As a result, economic substantive due process improperly 
aggrandizes the Court’s interpretation of “liberty”; once the Court abandons 
its procedural cabining, it can freely create substantive constitutional rights 
where none existed before.18 That self-empowerment by the Court 
undermines the countermajoritarian role imposed by the Constitution’s 
deliberate separation of powers: the judiciary is designed to check the 
legislature, not replace the legislature.19 Nowadays, Lochner generally serves 
as a scholarly shorthand to condemn cases where the Court goes too far in 
imposing its own ideology upon the nation.20 
Even after the demise of economic substantive due process, Lochner 
found a new role to play in First Amendment jurisprudence. Namely, the 
ghost of Lochnerism has lingered in the Court’s consideration of commercial 
speech from the start—the fact that Lochner is so universally derided has 
proved irresistible for Justices seeking to condemn the expanding protections 
for commercial speech on similar grounds.21 Those Justices argue that the 
Court’s commercial speech doctrine has warped the First Amendment to 
permit the Court’s freewheeling imposition of its preferred economic 
policies, just as Lochnerism did.22 And because the label of “Lochner” sparks 
such a visceral reaction, these comparisons have taken hold in the 
corresponding scholarship as well.23 
Indeed, the specter of Lochner has come to dominate scholarship that 
seeks to limit the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. Some 
scholars today contend that the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence may 
 
 17 See infra Section I.B. Note that this criticism does not necessarily extend to personal substantive 
due process cases, such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which arguably have a claim to 
constitutionality through the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Eileen McDonagh, The Next Step After 
Roe: Using Fundamental Rights, Equal Protection Analysis to Nullify Restrictive State-Level Abortion 
Legislation, 56 EMORY L.J. 1173, 1174 (2007) (“[T]he answer to the question of how to strengthen 
reproductive rights is to add constitutional guarantees under the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”). 
 18 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731–32 (1963) (recognizing the faults inherent in the doctrine 
of substantive due process). 
 19 See infra Section I.B. 
 20 David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (“Almost one 
hundred years after the Supreme Court decided the case, Lochner and its progeny remain the touchstone 
of judicial error. Avoiding Lochner’s mistake is the ‘central obsession’ of modern constitutional law.”). 
 21 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 591–92 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“History 
shows that the power [to invalidate economic regulations] was much abused and resulted in the 
constitutionalization of economic theories preferred by individual jurists.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy 
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 784 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is 
certainly nothing in the United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the 
teachings of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions regulating the pharmacy profession.”). 
 22 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 591–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 
784 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also infra Section II.A. 
 23 See infra Section II.B. 
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soon wholly replicate the expansive commercial protections provided by 
Lochner’s right to contract.24 The argument goes that, because speech is so 
pervasive in the commercial context, the First Amendment is on the path to 
preventing most, if not all, attempts at regulating commercial transactions.25 
That is, these scholars fear that the Court’s interpretation of “free speech” 
may soon safeguard any and all forms of speech from regulation—including 
speech integral to commercial relationships.26 This new definition would 
include, for example, speech that occurs during the exchange of goods or the 
formation of an employment contract.27 As such, these scholars posit that 
Lochnerism is at risk of being reborn under a new, broad characterization of 
the First Amendment.28 
That intense focus on the dangers of Lochnerizing speech, however, 
overlooks how the doctrines differ in at least one essential element: the right 
to contract protects freedom of conduct—what people may do—whereas the 
First Amendment protects freedom of speech—what people may say.29 As 
these principles translate to the commercial context, the right to contract 
protects the ability to participate in an economic transaction, and the First 
Amendment protects the ability to propose an economic transaction. That 
distinction is not a small one; it implicates entirely different regulatory 
concerns and approaches.30 More specifically, economic substantive due 
process is confined to the realm of contractual relationships,31 but the First 
Amendment proscribes regulations that target purely persuasive 
expression.32 The commercial speech doctrine therefore cannot prevent 
regulation of a transaction, just the communicative language leading up to it. 
To the extent speech occurs in the transaction itself, that speech is not purely 
communicative and receives no First Amendment protection.33 Accordingly, 
 
 24  See infra Section II.B (discussing the recent work of Professors Robert Post and Amanda Shanor). 
 25 Shanor, supra note 10, at 182 (describing the “radical deregulatory potential” of First Amendment 
Lochnerism). 
 26 See, e.g., id. 
 27 See infra Section II.B. 
 28 Shanor, supra note 10, at 186 (“[The ‘new’ Lochner] largely relies on the notion that the First 
Amendment protects speech as such and the autonomy of all speakers regardless of context.”). 
 29 See infra Section III.B. 
 30 See infra notes 202–203 and accompanying text. 
 31 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1914) (explaining that the right of contract serves to protect 
peoples’ ability to freely operate and enter into contractual relationships within the marketplace), 
overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
 32 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) 
(describing the need to grant people access to the information provided by commercial speech so they 
can improve their knowledge of the commercial sphere). 
 33 See infra Section III.B. 
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the First Amendment’s inherent limitations mean it will never serve as a 
genuine replacement for Lochnerism. 
The reality, then, is that Lochner’s role in the commercial speech 
doctrine is one of fearmongering. Although comparisons between the two 
may have initially been premised on overlapping concerns of judicial 
interference in the marketplace, recent developments in the scholarship34 
reflect the fact that Lochner should not have been injected into the First 
Amendment conversation to begin with. At a certain point, it is simply too 
tempting for opponents of the commercial speech doctrine to point to 
Lochnerism as an omen of things to come.35 But those arguments are 
inherently misleading: just because Lochner is recognized as a mistake today 
does not mean the commercial speech doctrine is equally misguided. 
That is not to say the commercial speech doctrine is not worth 
discussing at all. Indeed, there are rational debates to be had about how 
expansively the First Amendment should protect commercial speech36 and 
the associated regulatory implications37—these are important questions that 
will prove instrumental in shaping the future of advertising in America, and 
this Note does not attempt to resolve the dispute one way or another. But 
such issues concern commercial speech, not conduct, and must be examined 
under the appropriate, First Amendment lens. Only that lens allows scholars 
to draw accurate lines between valued and unvalued forms of expression; an 
analytical approach focused on Lochnerism instead leads to confusion and 
halts productive conversation in its tracks.38 In other words, the question is 
not whether the development of the commercial speech doctrine happens to 
remind scholars of economic substantive due process but whether it 
comports with the First Amendment’s values of protecting pure speech. 
Accordingly, this Note argues that the shadow of Lochner must finally be 
extracted from the commercial speech doctrine. 
Part I provides an overview of the Lochner Era, tracking the short-lived 
history of economic substantive due process. It then discusses the 
 
 34 See infra Section II.B. 
 35 See Elliot Zaret, Commercial Speech and the Evolution of the First Amendment, 30 WASH. LAW. 
24, 31 (2015) (quoting Richard Samp’s concerns that these First Amendment discussions will not be 
“toned down” so long as people against that doctrine argue that their opponents are “trying to resurrect 
Lochner”). 
 36 Compare Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 
(2000) (arguing that commercial speech does not deserve full First Amendment recognition), with Martin 
H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of 
Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303 (2009) (arguing that, 
ironically, Professor Post commits the same sins of the Lochner Era by refusing to extend full First 
Amendment coverage to commercial speech). 
 37 See Shanor, supra note 10, at 171. 
 38 See infra Part III. 
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constitutional inadequacy of that doctrine and how the Court nonetheless 
used it to go beyond its strict countermajoritarian role. Part II turns to the 
commercial speech doctrine to examine the role Lochner has played in its 
development over the years, both in the jurisprudential and scholarly sense. 
Part III explores the distinction between speech and conduct in the First 
Amendment context before explaining how that nuance makes Lochnerism 
fundamentally different from the commercial speech doctrine. Part IV 
concludes by explaining the dangers of the tendency to insert Lochner into 
First Amendment matters, showing why the two doctrines must be separated. 
I. WHAT LOCHNER REPRESENTS TODAY 
Today, mere mention of the name Lochner tends to sound alarm bells. 
That case largely set the stage for the right to contract, which the Court used 
to impose its own ideology upon the nation throughout the early 1900s. Such 
an overstep threatens to undermine the entire purpose of the Constitution’s 
separation of powers, making Lochner and its progeny forceful fodder for 
criticism. This Part first examines economic substantive due process, as 
characterized by Lochner, including both its justification and the criticism 
the decision received at the time. It then describes the inherent flaws of the 
right to contract—namely, the inappropriately expansive powers it affords 
the judiciary. 
A. The Lochner Era 
Economic substantive due process is generally characterized as the 
invocation of the Due Process Clause’s guarantee of “liberty”39 to safeguard 
the right to contract.40 This doctrine had a relatively brief but fiery lifespan 
during a period known as the Lochner Era. The Lochner Era is best measured 
back to the 1890s, when the right to contract was initially recognized.41 The 
1897 case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana, in fact, was the first case where the Court 
explicitly relied on the right to contract in reaching its holding.42 
 
 39 The Due Process Clause dictates that no person shall not be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 40 See, e.g., Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 WIS. L. 
REV. 265, 270. 
 41 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (“The legislature may not, under the guise of 
protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and 
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.”). Lawton was the first case to hint at a right to contract 
inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment, but it only did so in passing. Just one year later, Frisbie v. United 
States expounded upon that foundation, using the phrase “liberty of contract” when discussing the limits 
of peoples’ inalienable rights. 157 U.S. 160, 165 (1895). 
 42 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). At issue in Allgeyer was a Louisiana statute restricting the capacity of 
its citizens to contract with out-of-state insurers. Id. at 583–84. The statute had been implicated because 
a New York insurance company’s policy was illegal under Louisiana law, see id., and a unanimous Court 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
476 
Nonetheless, the Allgeyer Court concluded that the right to contract was not 
absolute but could be regulated through a state’s police power when one of 
the state’s genuine interests was implicated.43 
But Lochner v. New York44 was quick to undermine Allgeyer’s caveat 
limiting the right to contract, thereby making itself the poster child for 
economic substantive due process. The Lochner Court faced a New York 
regulation that prohibited bakers from working more than sixty hours per 
week.45 Justice Peckham, writing for the majority, stressed the importance of 
the right to contract: the state’s asserted legislative authority must be 
“reasonable and appropriate” rather than “unnecessary and arbitrary” for a 
regulation to overcome the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection.46 The Court 
was emphatic that the legislature cannot simply assert any justification it 
wants without challenge; rather, the judiciary must determine the legitimacy 
of a statute’s proffered purpose, lest the Constitution be rendered powerless 
in its ability to restrain the state.47 
Ultimately, the Lochner Court concluded that New York’s justifications 
for the exercise of its police power were insufficient to override the right to 
contract. The Court discounted any potential health-oriented rationales 
motivating the statute,48 despite existing evidence that bakers worked in 
uniquely unsanitary conditions.49 Moreover, the Court did not construe the 
 
noted that Louisiana’s regulation would have controlled the policy had it been within Louisiana’s 
jurisdiction, id. But in this case, the Court held that the Louisiana legislature had overstepped its bounds 
by seeking to restrict a New York policy solely on the grounds that its domiciliary was one of the 
contracting parties. Id. at 592. In reaching that decision, the Court determined that a person’s right to 
contract is inherent in the Due Process Clause’s provision guaranteeing “liberty,” id. at 589, and the 
Louisiana legislature violated that right in seeking to regulate a contract with which it had insufficient 
connections, making the statute unconstitutional, id. at 591–92. 
 43 Id. at 591 (reasoning that the right to contract “may be regulated and sometimes prohibited” when 
it conflicts with the state’s policies and is properly within the scope of that State’s jurisdiction). 
 44 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 45 Id. at 52. 
 46 Id. at 56. 
 47 Id. at 60 (concluding that, were state legislatures given free rein, “the protection of the Federal 
Constitution from undue interference with liberty of person and freedom of contract [would be] visionary, 
wherever the law is sought to be justified as a valid exercise of the police power”). 
 48 Id. at 57–60 (arguing that if baking were to be considered unhealthy, then most other professions 
would be subject to that same classification). The state had claimed its police powers could derive from 
either the quality of bread being sold or the health of the bakers themselves. Id. 
 49 See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 538 
(2015) (discussing the danger of “white lung disease” facing bakers at the time who worked excess hours) 
(quoting Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Tradition or Change in Constitutional Law?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& LIBERTY 404, 408 (2005)); see also Lochner, 198 U.S. at 70–71 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see DAVID 
E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE 
REFORM 26–32 (2011) (arguing that the health motivations were, at best, questionable, and New York 
instead may have been attempting to support larger bakeries, which had the resources to comply with the 
law). 
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bakers as a class necessitating enhanced protection from the legislature in 
the exercise of their economic rights.50 And because the bakers were 
otherwise competent when they agreed to enter into these contracts, the 
Court presumed that the legislature was paternalistically meddling in what 
was really a consensual relationship.51 
In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the Court had overstepped its 
limited judicial role. Rather than objecting to the underlying notion of the 
right to contract,52 however, he dissented because he believed the Court had 
improperly discounted the apparently dangerous health conditions of 
bakeries that had ostensibly prompted New York to pass the statute in 
question.53 Justice Harlan noted that Allgeyer had left room for states to 
regulate contracts and contended that a statute must conflict with the 
Constitution “beyond all question” before the Court can intervene.54 His 
dissent was thus a call for curtailing, not completely dispelling, the Court’s 
ability to impose a laissez-faire market. 
Justice Holmes’s brief dissent described a considerably more 
deferential approach to judicial review than Justice Harlan’s. Taking aim at 
the Court’s decision to constitutionally enforce a laissez-faire economy, 
Justice Holmes attacked the foundational baseline of economic substantive 
due process itself: the right to contract.55 In his now famous line, Justice 
Holmes asserted that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. 
Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”56 According to Justice Holmes, that the 
New York legislature had chosen to follow a reasonable regulatory model 
was itself sufficient regardless of the statute’s paternalistic nature.57 By 
turning to the “liberty” provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to prop up 
the right to contract, Justice Holmes feared that the Court had effectively 
neutered legislatures’ ability to enact popular opinion.58 And although he was 
not willing to foreclose the prospect of substantive due process altogether, 
he concluded that it should only be implicated in the most extreme of 
 
 50 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57 (majority opinion) (concluding that bakers “are in no sense wards of the 
State” because they are “equal in intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations” 
and can “assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the State”). 
 51 See id. at 52–53. 
 52 Id. at 65–66 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)). 
 53 Id. at 70–71 (discussing then-contemporary treatises and reports that alluded to the dangerous 
health conditions of a baking profession). 
 54 Id. at 66–68 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). 
 55 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 56 Id. In Social Statics, Spencer argued “in favour of an extreme form of economic and social laissez-
faire.” Herbert Spencer, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/ 
biography/Herbert-Spencer#ref145497 [https://perma.cc/NF4H-USWD]. 
 57 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 58 Id. 
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circumstances.59 This approach to judicial deference became the rallying cry 
for those who opposed economic substantive due process.60 
Indeed, Progressives emphatically decried the dangers of the right to 
contract throughout the Lochner Era.61 By the turn of the century, “trends in 
economic thinking, and arguably the mood of the country, had begun to shift 
away from laissez faire-social Darwinism.”62 Instead, Progressives started 
turning to legislation as a means of widespread reform, largely relying on the 
states to improve working conditions.63 But when Lochner constitutionalized 
laissez-faire principles in 1905, it effectively stalled those burgeoning 
efforts.64 Subsequent cases, like Adair v. United States, wherein the Court 
struck down a statute that prohibited employers from firing an employee 
solely because of her union membership,65 and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital 
of D.C., which entailed the Court declaring unconstitutional a statute that 
fixed a minimum wage for women,66 only served to propagate the perception 
that Lochner had rendered “thorough debate on important public issues . . . 
practically futile.”67 
Progressives were thus left little recourse as the country careened 
toward the Great Depression;68 in fact, the Court was able to continue 
expanding upon the right to contract all the way up to the early stages of the 
New Deal.69 Justice Holmes remained resolute in his dissent throughout this 
 
 59 Id. (reasoning that substantive due process does not come into play “unless it can be said that a 
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental 
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law”). 
 60 Colby & Smith, supra note 49, at 541. 
 61 See PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 153 (1998). 
 62 Id. at 149–50. 
 63 See id. at 150 (“Mainstream reformers believed that the states had a duty to promote the general 
welfare and common good.”). 
 64 Id. at 152 (“By adopting the doctrine of liberty of contract and the narrow definition of the police 
power, [the Court] said that as a matter of fundamental law, promotion of public health, safety, and morals 
was the only legitimate motive for economic and social reform.”). 
 65 208 U.S. 161, 175–76 (1908) (reasoning that “the employer and the employé [sic] have equality 
of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of 
contract”), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
 66 261 U.S. 525, 554, 562 (1923) (arguing that women “are legally as capable of contracting for 
themselves as men”), overruled in part by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 67 KENS, supra note 61, at 152. 
 68 Colby & Smith, supra note 49, at 539 (“[T]he recalcitrant and activist Lochner-era Court stood in 
the way of overwhelmingly popular and economically necessary Progressive legislation, perhaps 
contributing to or worsening the Great Depression.”). 
 69 See KENS, supra note 61, at 153 (“[Lochner] and the Court were the bane of contemporary 
reformers—first of Progressives and then of the early New Dealers.”). As a result of its longevity, it is 
possible the Lochner Era resulted in approximately 200 laws being declared unconstitutional. See 
BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (1942). But see Michael 
J. Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process Effective?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 
114:469 (2019) This Isn’t Lochner, It’s the First Amendment 
479 
period, citing the same concerns regarding judicial overreach that he had 
raised in Lochner.70 But it was not until 1937, apparently in reaction to 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, that the Court 
finally yielded to Progressives and adopted Holmes’s deferential approach.71 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish72 served as the vehicle for that sudden 
transition. When faced with a Washington State law that enacted a minimum 
wage for women,73 the Court noted that the right to contract is not 
enumerated in the Constitution.74 In stark contrast to Lochnerian cases, the 
West Coast Hotel Court was willing to restrain the Due Process Clause’s 
protection of liberty, and therefore the right to contract, in favor of deferring 
to the legislature’s policy decision.75 Through its adoption of that newly 
deferential approach, the Court effectively signaled the end of the Lochner 
Era and the demise of the right to contract.76 
B. Scholarly Critiques of Lochnerism 
Most scholars today agree that Lochner was incorrectly decided.77 As 
Professor Martin Redish and Matthew Arnould note, the judiciary is not 
 
1049, 1080 (1997) (asserting that the Lochner Era only resulted in fifty-five laws stricken due to economic 
substantive due process). 
 70 See, e.g., Adkins, 261 U.S. at 568–70 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussing how the “right to 
contract” is an entirely court-created doctrine and should not be used to overcome reasonable enactments 
of the legislature); Adair, 208 U.S. at 191 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I confess that I think that the right to 
make contracts at will that has been derived from the word liberty in the [Fifth and Fourteenth] 
amendments has been stretched to its extreme.”). Justice Holmes was resolute even when substantive due 
process was briefly expanded to protect civil rights—namely, the right to teach one’s children a foreign 
language—in Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting). But interestingly, 
he did not dissent in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, wherein the Court relied on substantive due process when 
it unanimously struck down a law that required children to attend public school. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 71 See Colby & Smith, supra note 49, at 543. 
 72 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 73 Id. at 386. 
 74 Id. at 391 (“The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”). 
 75 Id. (“Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and 
regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community 
is due process.”). Notably, the Court did not seem to discount the principles underlying a right to contract, 
instead choosing to simply diminish their influence over legislative enactments. 
 76 Colby & Smith, supra note 49, at 543 (explaining how West Coast Hotel “ended the Lochner 
[E]ra”). 
 77 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 224 (rev. ed. 2014) (“Condemnation of Lochner has become de rigueur among law professors 
of nearly all stripes.”); BERNSTEIN, supra note 49, at i (“If you want to raise eyebrows at a gathering of 
judges or legal scholars, try praising the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York.”); KENS, 
supra note 61, at 2 (“For more than eighty years [Lochner] has served legal scholars as a poignant example 
of judicial activism.”); see also infra Part II (describing how Lochner is used as a warning sign in the 
context of commercial speech). 
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meant to usurp the role of the legislative branch.78 Redish and Arnould 
emphasize that legislators are democratically elected; hence, they are free to 
sway with the whims of the people because the people ultimately hold them 
responsible for their actions.79 Conversely, members of the Court are 
appointed, not elected, and receive lifetime tenure, meaning they are not 
democratically accountable to the people.80 In other words, the Court does 
not answer to the people for its decisions, and that design choice, per Redish 
and Arnould, is meant to ensure that its holdings remain untainted by popular 
opinion.81 
But the Court’s lack of accountability can cut both ways. Redish and 
Arnould contend that when the Court decides to unprincipledly thrust its own 
political or ideological preferences upon the nation, it abandons its 
countermajoritarian role and leaves the people essentially powerless in their 
own democracy.82 The Constitution is expressly designed to prevent those 
sorts of power grabs, but according to Redish and Arnould, the judiciary has 
been historically willing to ignore the clear dictate of the separation of 
powers.83 On the other hand, Redish and Arnould recognize that the Court’s 
role within the separation of powers framework is to check the legislature; 
acknowledging the Court’s structural limitations does not require outright 
stripping it of  its countermajoritarian function.84 Thus, Redish and Arnould 
conclude that the Court should absolutely strike down certain legislation, but 
only when it can point to a guiding rationale that is firmly grounded in a clear 
constitutional directive.85 Adhering to this guiding principle ensures a fair, 
unbiased approach, free of the individual Justices’ political influence.86 
According to Redish and Arnould, then, the inexorable flaw within the 
doctrine of economic substantive due process is that there is no objective 
way to define its ethereal constitutional foundation. As the two argue, the 
 
 78 See Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and 
the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1491–
92 (2012). 
 79 See id. at 1532. 
 80 Stephen L. Mikochik, Self Restraint and Substantive Due Process, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 817, 
819–20 (2009). 
 81 See Redish & Arnould, supra note 78, at 1523. 
 82 Id. at 1509. 
 83 See id. at 1531–32. 
 84 See id. at 1523 (explaining that the Constitution and judiciary’s purpose is to “shield[] certain 
rights and powers from majority encroachment or abuse”). 
 85 See id. at 1533–35 (proposing a “controlled activism” model in which the Court would have to be 
faithful in its interpretation of unambiguous text and both transparent and consistent when interpreting 
inherently ambiguous provisions). 
 86 See id. 
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doctrine overlooks the Due Process Clause’s obvious purpose: process.87 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the Constitution could have been clearer 
about this point, as it explicitly gives the Clause a procedural focus in the 
very label of “due process.”88 Redish and Arnould therefore reason that the 
right to contract should not be construed as one that is absolute but rather 
one that can be “taken from citizens, as long as proper procedures are 
followed.”89 In Lochner, those proper procedures were the ones the New 
York legislature provided through its weighing of the options and ultimate 
decision to enact a regulation that limited bakers’ working hours.90 The Court 
nonetheless ignored that fact and substituted its own desired politics to 
enshrine the right to contract.91 
Indeed, the twisting of a procedural guarantee to create a newfound 
substantive right goes to the very heart of Redish and Arnould’s concerns 
regarding judicial overreach.92 When the Court overlooks the clear 
procedural cabining of the Due Process Clause, its interpretation of “liberty” 
becomes an all-powerful forge of substantive guarantees, and the legislature 
has no means of reining in the Court’s discretion.93 The fallacy of the right 
to contract is thus entirely divorced from political opinion; if utilizing the 
Due Process Clause to create substantive rights was a proper interpretation 
of the text, the right to contract would have a fair claim to constitutionality. 
But as Redish and Arnould suggest, the Lochner Court had to fundamentally 
 
 87 Id. at 1524. 
 88 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 89 Redish & Arnould, supra note 78, at 1524. 
 90 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (explaining why 
the New York legislature’s rationale behind enacting the regulation should not be subject to the Court’s 
personal preferences). 
 91 See id. at 64 (majority opinion). 
 92 See Redish & Arnould, supra note 78, at 1524; see also KENS, supra note 61, at 100 (“In adopting 
substantive due process, the judicial branch was doing much more than protecting its own authority. It 
now assumed that it had the right to reign over the legislative domain of states.”). Thus, even Holmes’s 
Lochner dissent did not go far enough because it left the door open for a form of substantive due process 
when a right is deemed “fundamental.” See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Although the question 
of whether a right is “fundamental” appears to be tackling the difficult issue of identifying protectable 
rights, see Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(identifying the “vague contours” of the Due Process Clause), it overlooks the simple fact that no matter 
how rights are identified, the procedural barrier of the Due Process Clause prevents their substantive 
application. 
 93 Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE 
L.J. 1672, 1799–80 (2012) (describing how the utilization of substantive due process improperly 
“create[s] an inalienable liberty of undefined terms, beyond the reach of a duly elected legislature”). It 
should be noted, though, that the Equal Protection Clause can serve as an independent textual hook for 
many civil rights that are currently protected by substantive due process. See, e.g., McDonagh, supra note 
17, at 1174 (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause can protect woman’s reproductive rights). 
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subvert the Due Process Clause’s prima facie procedural purpose to justify 
superimposing its own political ideology upon the nation.94 
Still, some contemporary scholars are now seeking to revitalize 
Lochnerism.95 The most prevalent argument, advanced by Professor Randy 
Barnett, is that Lochner was simply a recognition that the Constitution must 
be read to protect natural rights96 regardless of whether they are explicitly 
enumerated, including the right to contract.97 Professor Barnett contends that 
the Due Process Clause is simply standing in for the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause,98 meaning concerns over 
“procedure”99 should not proscribe the application of economic substantive 
due process.100 Alternatively, he posits that the Ninth Amendment101 protects 
the right to contract, among other natural rights.102 In either case, Professor 
Barnett supports Lochner because, even if the Court found a right to contract 
 
 94 Redish & Arnould, supra note 78, at 1524 (“[T]he concept of ‘procedural process’ is redundant—
just as the concept of ‘substantive process’ is oxymoronic.”). 
 95 Colby & Smith, supra note 49, at 592–600 (discussing how “new originalism” has shifted gears 
to embrace the doctrine of substantive due process, thereby opening the door to a return of Lochner). 
 96 Professor Barnett acknowledges that originalist sources would not be enough to clarify every one 
of the numerous natural rights safeguarded in his vision of the Constitution. BARNETT, supra note 77, at 
261 (“[T]he original meaning of the rights retained by the people cannot be confined to the specific 
liberties identified by originalist materials.”). Accordingly, he claims that an impartial judiciary must be 
trusted to pick the rights worthy of protection. Id. at 269. Such an approach, however, begs the question 
of how to go about ensuring the Court is acting principledly in its selection of deserving rights. 
 97 Id. at 262 (arguing that natural rights merit a “presumption of constitutionality,” meaning the 
legislature has the burden of justifying any law that seeks to curtail one of those rights). The Lochner Era 
Court took a similar approach to finding rights within the “liberty” provision. Cf. Twining v. New Jersey, 
211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (“If this is [a violation of due process], it is not because those rights are enumerated 
in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the 
conception of due process of law.”), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 98 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”). The Privileges or Immunities Clause was 
largely neutered by the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1873). 
 99 See supra notes 87–94 and accompanying text. 
 100 BARNETT, supra note 77, at 208. Notably, at this point, it is probably too late to go back on the 
substantive due process doctrine in favor of the more constitutionally appropriate vehicle. See generally 
Jeffrey D. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish For: Why McDonald v. City of Chicago’s Rejection of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad Thing for Rights, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 561 
(2011) (discussing how substantive due process has taken up the mantle of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause ever since the Slaughter-House Cases). But see Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 691 (2019) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (reasoning that the Privileges or Immunities Clause should be used to 
incorporate the Eighth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause); id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (same). 
 101 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
 102 BARNETT, supra note 77, at 244. Justice Goldberg took this approach in his concurrence to 
Griswold v. Connecticut, reasoning that the Ninth Amendment protects the right for married people to 
use contraceptives, 381 U.S. 479, 491–92 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring), but it has never been adopted 
by a majority on the Court. 
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in the improper constitutional vehicle, the right to contract, along with other 
natural rights, nevertheless exists within permissible constitutional 
confines.103 
But Justice Black persuasively refuted both proffered sources of natural 
rights during his time on the Court. First, in Duncan v. Louisiana, he 
suggested that the Privileges or Immunities Clause should incorporate only 
the explicitly enumerated provisions in the Bill of Rights and not any 
unenumerated, natural rights.104 He noted that reading the Fourteenth 
Amendment as enforcing atextual rights, like the right to contract, would 
wholly undermine the Constitution’s efforts to limit judicial discretion; there 
would be no principled methodology of identifying which rights are 
protected and which are not.105 And second, dissenting in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, Justice Black contended that the Ninth Amendment does not 
decree that natural rights are automatically constitutionally protected but 
only that state laws protecting them are not necessarily unconstitutional.106 
In that sense, Justice Black read the Amendment as an anti-preemption 
provision: the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights are not the only rights 
that can be protected by the legislature.107 Indeed, he noted that if the Ninth 
Amendment constitutionally enforced unenumerated rights, it would give the 
unaccountable judiciary untethered discretion over picking and choosing the 
liberties it wanted to protect.108 
Thus, according to Justice Black, to point to the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause or Ninth Amendment as justifying Lochnerism is to run 
into the same problems inherent in economic substantive due process. Any 
 
 103 See BARNETT, supra note 77, at 216–17 (dismissing Justice Holmes’s Lochner dissent as 
“unfair”). 
 104 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J. concurring) (“[The text of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause] seem[s] to me an eminently reasonable way of expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of 
Rights shall apply to the States.”). 
 105 See id. at 168 (“It is impossible for me to believe that such unconfined power is given to judges 
in our Constitution that is a written one in order to limit governmental power.”). Although Justice Black 
made that argument in the context of the Due Process Clause, it applies just as easily to the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 43, 52 (1989) (warning that reading the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause to include unenumerated rights “holds special hazards for judges who are mindful that 
their proper task is not to write their personal views of appropriate public policy into the Constitution”); 
cf. Kurt T. Lash, Federalism and the Original Fourteenth Amendment, 42 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 
78–79 (2019) (referencing Frederick Douglass’s belief that the Privileges or Immunities Clause had to be 
restricted to enumerated rights to avoid creating a “despotic” central government). 
 106 381 U.S. at 519–20 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 107 See id. 
 108 Id. at 520–21 (“The adoption of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws 
unconstitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great unconstitutional shift of power to the 
courts.”). 
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of these approaches supplies a blank check to the judiciary, allowing it to 
freely constitutionalize its preferred policies in a wholesale abandonment of 
its limited checking role.109 Contemporary scholars have widely recognized 
this fallacy embedded in a theory of natural rights. Accordingly, Lochner 
today has been relegated to serving as a condemnable symbol of judicial 
overreach.110 In no realm is Lochner’s symbolism more weaponized than that 
of commercial speech. 
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE AND ITS TIES TO LOCHNERISM 
The shadow of Lochner has long plagued the commercial speech 
doctrine. Indeed, the Court has never been able to extend even partial 
constitutional status to commercial speech without dissenting Justices and 
scholars alike arguing that it was attempting to surreptitiously reinvigorate 
economic substantive due process. These comparisons have only increased 
in intensity as the Court has continued to expand the First Amendment’s 
coverage of commercial speech. This Part explores the Court’s evolving 
treatment of commercial speech and how some Justices—namely, Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Breyer—have referenced Lochner in protest. It then 
examines how scholars have used the specter of Lochnerism in their attempts 
to push back against the expansion of the commercial speech doctrine. 
A. Constructing the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
The Court has generally construed commercial speech as “expression 
advocating purchase.”111 Like Lochner itself, this doctrine experienced a 
tumultuous history in terms of constitutional coverage;112 it was not until 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc. in 1976 that the Court brought commercial speech into the constitutional 
fold.113 In that case, the law at issue was a Virginia regulation that punished 
physicians who advertised the price of prescription-only drugs.114 In 
analyzing the value of those advertisements, the Court for the first time 
 
 109 See supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 78–86 and accompanying 
text. 
 110 Supra note 77 and accompanying text (highlighting the near-universal condemnation of 
Lochnerism). 
 111 Redish, supra note 4, at 75. 
 112 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“We are equally clear that the Constitution 
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”), overruled by Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Jeremy K. Kessler, 
The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1956–76 (2016) (discussing 
how the tax peddling cases in the 1940s foreshadowed the constitutionalization of commercial speech). 
 113 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 114 Id. at 752. 
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considered the listeners’—that is, the public’s—interest in hearing 
commercial speech.115 It asserted that many people would benefit more from 
hearing the prices of drugs than they would from hearing other forms of 
speech that are afforded full constitutional protection, such as political 
speech.116 The Court further observed that advertisements are necessary to 
facilitating people’s frequent decision-making in the massive, complex 
commercial world117 and helping people decide how that commercial world 
should be regulated.118 The Court was thus resolute that the Constitution 
would no longer permit legislatures to “keep[] the public in ignorance.”119 
Instead, the First Amendment would serve to “open the channels of 
communication” to the people by providing at least some protection for 
commercial speech.120 
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the First Amendment should 
not be deployed as a tool with which the Court can control how legislatures 
approach economic regulations.121 He asserted that the First Amendment is 
concerned with collective choices made by society as a whole, not an 
individual’s personal decisions on what to purchase; thus, he would not have 
applied the First Amendment to commercial speech in the first place.122 So 
in an echo of Justice Holmes’s Lochner dissent, Justice Rehnquist contended 
that the Court had contorted the First Amendment to protect commercial 
speech in an impermissible instance of judicial overreach.123 Indeed, Justice 
Rehnquist went so far as to reference Justice Holmes’s famous line from 
Lochner, stating, “[T]here is certainly nothing in the United States 
 
 115 Id. at 756–57 (“If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the 
advertising.”). 
 116 Id. at 763 (stating that a person’s interest in hearing this commercial information “may be as keen, 
if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate”). 
 117 Id. at 765. Unsurprisingly, this need was considered particularly acute if that person was in 
specific need of the medicine in question. Id. at 763–64. 
 118 Id. at 765 (“[E]ven if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten 
public decisionmaking [sic] in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not 
serve that goal.”). 
 119 Id. at 770. 
 120 Id. That protection, however, was limited to truthful commercial speech—false commercial 
speech remained wholly uncovered. Id. at 771–72 & n.24 (“The First Amendment, as we construe it 
today, does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly 
as well as freely.”). In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart emphasized this point, contending that 
advertisers have unique insight into and economic incentive regarding their product, thereby bolstering 
commercial speech’s durability. Id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring). Moreover, he argued that because 
commercial speech itself does not contribute to “ideological expression,” but instead merely concerns 
selling a product, it deserves lower levels of constitutional protection. Id. at 780–81. 
 121 Id. at 788–89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 122 Id. at 787. 
 123 Id. at 783–84. 
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Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the teachings 
of Adam Smith.”124 Similarly, when the Court laid out a test resembling 
intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech a few years later, Justice 
Rehnquist reiterated that the Court had reinvigorated the right to contract’s 
capacity to freely strike down economic regulations, lamenting that “[t]he 
Court in [its decision] returns to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York.”125 
Despite Justice Rehnquist’s outcries, the commercial speech doctrine 
has continued expanding to this day. Perhaps no contemporary case in this 
arena is more divisive than Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., a 2011 case wherein 
the Court struck down a Vermont law that, among other things, prohibited 
pharmacies from selling prescriber information to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers for marketing purposes.126 The Court did not decide one way 
or the other whether the sale of data itself was protected speech;127 however, 
it found that the law posed more than an incidental burden on speech,128 
pointing to pharmaceutical manufacturers’ marketing efforts that had 
traditionally relied on access to the now-unavailable prescription 
information.129 With the First Amendment thus implicated, the Court 
classified the Vermont statute as a form of content-based discrimination 
since it only impacted marketing—that is, commercial—uses of the data.130 
Moreover, it concluded that the law was also an instance of speaker-based 
discrimination in that it only sought to regulate commercial entities; other 
speakers were wholly unaffected.131 
According to the Court, the statute was akin to a “law prohibiting trade 
magazines [and only trade magazines] from purchasing or using ink.”132 
Although the purchase of ink clearly is not speech, it is an integral element 
of trade magazines’ ability to speak—just like the sale of prescription 
information is crucial to pharmaceutical companies’ speech. Such 
 
 124 Id. at 784; cf. supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 125 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 589 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 126 564 U.S. 552, 563 (2011). 
 127 Id. at 571 (“[T]his case can be resolved even assuming, as the State argues, that prescriber-
identifying information is a mere commodity [as opposed to speech].”). 
 128 Id. at 567. 
 129 Id. at 558 (“Detailers, who represent [pharmaceutical] manufacturers, then use the reports [based 
on prescriber-identifying information] to refine their marketing tactics and increase sales.”). 
 130 Id. at 564 (“The statute thus disfavors marketing, that is, speech with a particular content.”) 
 131 Id. (“More than that, the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.”). The Court further held that the statute’s practical application amounted to viewpoint 
discrimination because it was specifically regulating against commercial speakers’ profit-making 
incentives. Id. at 565 (“Vermont’s law ‘goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual 
viewpoint discrimination.’”) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)). 
 132 Id. at 571. 
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discriminatory laws had long been presumptively unconstitutional in the 
noncommercial context,133 but this was the first time the Court extended that 
same protection to commercial speech.134 Ultimately, the Court reasoned that 
content- or speaker-based discriminatory regulations affecting commercial 
speech merit a higher level of scrutiny.135 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Sorrell picked up the Lochner torch where 
Justice Rehnquist had left it. In addition to maintaining intermediate scrutiny 
for regulations impacting commercial speech,136 Justice Breyer would have 
construed the Vermont law as only having a minimal impact on speech, 
thereby avoiding the First Amendment altogether.137 He thus warned that the 
Court’s holding would severely constrain legislatures’ ability to enact 
economic regulations.138 Indeed, he believed the decision expanded the First 
Amendment such that it reopened the Lochnerian door to constitutionalizing 
a laissez-faire marketplace that aligned with the Court’s personal 
preferences.139 And this was not a one-off comparison for Justice Breyer;140 
 
 133 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
115 (1991). 
 134 Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech or Resurrecting Lochner?, 
2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 133–34 (2011). 
 135 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565 (“Act 80 is designed to impose a specific, content-based burden on 
protected expression. It follows that heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted.”). Notably, the Court never 
had to clarify exactly how strict this new scrutiny should be as it also found that the regulation failed to 
meet the intermediary scrutiny required by Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571–79. Still, the Court later suggested that by 
“heightened scrutiny,” it meant strict scrutiny. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
In so reasoning, the Court has effectively granted full First Amendment protection to truthful commercial 
speech. Martin H. Redish & Kyle Voils, False Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: 
Understanding the Implications of the Equivalency Principle, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 776 
(2017). False commercial speech, however, remains unprotected. Id. at 767. 
 136 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 582 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to the test established in Central 
Hudson). 
 137 Id. at 585–88 (“Vermont’s statute neither forbids nor requires anyone to say anything, to engage 
in any form of symbolic speech, or to endorse any particular view, whether ideological or related to the 
sale of a product.”). But see supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s construal 
of the law as having a significant burden on speech). 
 138 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 585–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court has traditionally, and 
properly, showed great deference to the legislature in this regard); see also id. at 588–91 (explaining that 
economic legislation often necessarily makes distinctions based on the expression’s content or the 
speaker’s identity). 
 139 Id. at 591–92 (“History shows that the power [to intervene in economic regulations] was much 
abused and resulted in the constitutionalization of economic theories preferred by individual jurists.”). In 
reply to this challenge in particular, the Court quipped, “The Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statics. It does enact the First Amendment.” Id. at 567 (majority opinion) (quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 140 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2381 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (contending that the Court was continuing to deviate from its post-Lochner path of leaving 
economic regulation in the hands of the legislature). 
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his ongoing references to Lochner elucidate the crucial role the case plays in 
the Court’s debate concerning the constitutional merits of commercial 
speech. 
B. Scholarly Invocations of Lochner 
Scholars, too, have sensed Lochner lurking in the shadows of 
commercial speech. Indeed, as far back as 1979, scholars had begun 
comparing the two doctrines, contending that the then-recently decided 
Virginia State Board effectively “renovat[ed]” Lochnerism under the 
auspices of the First Amendment.141 And scholars have only become more 
insistent in advancing these arguments today, with various pieces rallying 
against expanding protections for commercial speech by citing the widely 
discredited Lochner Era.142 
Most notably, Professors Robert Post and Amanda Shanor worry that 
the commercial speech doctrine threatens to become just as potent as 
Lochner’s economic substantive due process.143 They fear that because 
speech is inherent in every communication, including those that are 
commercial, the First Amendment could potentially stretch to cover 
economic transactions themselves.144 The argument goes that the First 
Amendment’s protection of speech, taken to its extreme, could also cover 
the speech involved in buying and exchanging goods, creating terms of 
employment, and the like.145 In other words, if certain conduct is at all 
manifested through speech, it could be exempted from regulation under the 
First Amendment’s guarantee of “free speech.” By this logic, any law 
 
 141 Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and 
the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 30–32 (1979). The authors concluded that the commercial speech 
doctrine was not raising more widespread concern due to the generally high regard afforded to the First 
Amendment. Id. at 32. 
 142 See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First Amendment Imperialism, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 659, 666 
(“Lochner, then, has returned. Once again, our Court is trying to solve the problems of our joint economic 
life by interpreting the principles of liberal abstention.”); Rebecca Tushnet, COOL Story: Country of 
Origin Labeling and the First Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 25, 26 (2005) (“[T]he First Amendment 
has become the new Lochner, used by profit-seeking actors to interfere with the regulatory state in a way 
that substantive due process no longer allows.”); Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and 
Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1472 (2017) 
(“[T]he doctrinal expansion of the neo-Lochner movement undermines the areas of law that are newly 
covered and—because of the libertarian tradition that developed to justify the speech doctrine’s outward 
movement—risks undermining the theoretical foundation of the First Amendment itself.”). 
 143 Post & Shanor, supra note 10, at 167 (“It is no exaggeration to observe that the First Amendment 
has become a powerful engine of constitutional deregulation. The echoes of Lochner are palpable.”). 
 144 Id. at 166. 
 145 See id. at 166–67. 
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seeking to regulate economic transactions could soon face challenges from 
the First Amendment.146 
According to Professors Post and Shanor, the commercial speech 
doctrine was originally designed to prevent this outcome. The Court in 
Virginia State Board only granted commercial speech constitutional 
protection so far as it benefited listeners, not speakers,147 and Professors Post 
and Shanor contend that this caveat reflects the Court’s decision to allow 
more expansive regulation in the commercial sphere.148 But they go on to 
suggest that courts in recent years have focused more on the interests of 
speakers than those of listeners, in the process eroding the doctrine’s original 
limitations.149 As a result, Professors Post and Shanor conclude that the First 
Amendment is well on its way to replacing Lochnerism’s immense control 
of regulations in the commercial sphere.150 
Professor Shanor builds upon that line of argumentation in her aptly 
titled article, The New Lochner.151 There, she reiterates that, in its fullest 
form, the First Amendment has “total deregulatory potential” because speech 
is involved in nearly all aspects of human life.152 The commercial sphere is 
no exception.153 Indeed, were a theory of “speech as such,” accepted, 
meaning any and all speech falls within the First Amendment’s coverage,154 
Professor Shanor contends that the pervasiveness of speech in economic 
transactions would prevent essentially all attempts at regulating the 
commercial sphere.155 And she believes the modern approach to commercial 
 
 146 See id. 
 147 See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text. 
 148 Post & Shanor, supra note 10, at 169–70 (“[The] [c]ommercial speech doctrine was invented with 
the clear understanding that the state would be freer to regulate in the domain of commercial speech than 
it was ‘in the realm of noncommercial expression.’”) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 
447, 456 (1978)). 
 149 Id. at 170–73. 
 150 Id. at 182 (reasoning that the expanded First Amendment doctrine “threatens to revive the long-
lost world of Lochner and destroy the very democratic governance the First Amendment is designed to 
protect”). 
 151 Shanor, supra note 10. 
 152 Id. at 135. Even the 9/11 attacks, according to Professor Shanor, entail expressive elements that 
could be construed as falling within the realm of protected speech were the principle taken to its most 
extreme conclusion. Id. at 176–77. 
 153 Id. at 181 (“[A]ny sale or contract involves the communicative elements of offer and 
acceptance.”). 
 154 Id. at 186–88. 
 155 See id. at 182 (“Due to the pervasiveness of speech and expression, particularly in the information 
age, the coverage and level of protection for speech uniquely constitute the fullest boundary line of 
constitutional state action.”). In line with Professor Shanor’s “speech as such” contention, some scholars 
suggest that the right to contract itself should be included within the First Amendment’s coverage because 
contracts are made up of language that could be construed as “free speech.” See, e.g., Steven C. Begakis, 
Rediscovering Liberty of Contract: The Unnoticed Economic Right Contained in the Freedom of Speech, 
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regulation—one focused on regulations that seek to rein in certain conduct 
through means other than outright banning it—is especially susceptible to 
such First Amendment challenges.156 This “new Lochner,” then, supposedly 
threatens to steadfastly shield the autonomy of commercial speakers157 as the 
right to contract had done before.158 
Professor Shanor, in fact, suggests that the First Amendment could pose 
an even greater threat to economic regulation than Lochner did. Although 
she acknowledges that the two doctrines are not perfectly identical,159 
Professor Shanor argues that these discrepancies might actually make the 
First Amendment a more powerful tool for the Court to exploit. For instance, 
she notes that, in comparison to the Due Process Clause, free speech is the 
more widely accepted160 and valued161 doctrine, which would make it easier 
for people to support invalidating economic regulations on First Amendment 
grounds. Ultimately, Professor Shanor goes so far as to argue that 
“[c]ommercial speech protection possesses broader deregulatory capacity 
[than economic substantive due process]”—an unmistakable warning to 
those who have condemned Lochner over the years.162 By taking the notion 
of a deregulatory First Amendment to its extreme, Professor Shanor has 
propagated the historical trend of reframing the commercial speech doctrine 
in Lochnerian terms. That trend, though, misrepresents the true scope of the 
First Amendment. 
III. PURGING LOCHNER FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Deploying Lochner in the commercial speech context is misleading and 
unhelpful. Arguments that an expanded commercial speech doctrine will 
serve to curtail legislatures are correct in so far as they recognize that any 
expansion of rights would naturally result in more regulations being struck 
down when those new rights are impinged. Yet recklessly invoking the 
 
50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 57, 90 (2017) (“[T]he liberty to form a contract is secured by the text of the First 
Amendment, is implicit in the U.S. Supreme Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence, is justified by 
reference to originalist and traditionalist theory, and finds the most appropriate textual vehicle in the First 
Amendment.”). 
 156 Shanor, supra note 10, at 171 (“[T]he modern state regulates in ways that appear, or are more 
prone to appear, speech-regulating than earlier forms of administration.”). 
 157 See id. at 143. 
 158 See supra Section I.A. 
 159 Shanor, supra note 10, at 182 (explaining that the expanding commercial speech doctrine “is a 
story of constitutional conflict that has been told, if slightly differently, once before,” in the context of 
economic substantive due process (emphasis added)). 
 160 Id. at 184 (recognizing the First Amendment’s “textual hook”). 
 161 Id. at 186 (arguing that the protection of free speech is “more broadly attractive [than Lochner], 
particularly to more ‘progressive’ jurists”); see also id. at 189–90. 
 162 Id. at 137 (emphasis added). 
114:469 (2019) This Isn’t Lochner, It’s the First Amendment 
491 
Lochner label to describe these concerns only results in unproductive 
fearmongering.163 In reality, the commercial speech doctrine would be better 
served were Lochner removed from the discussion altogether: the two 
doctrines have entirely different scopes and thus implicate entirely different 
types of regulations. This Part begins by discussing the First Amendment’s 
means of distinguishing between purely persuasive expression, which fits 
under “free speech,” and conduct that goes beyond that limitation. It then 
applies these First Amendment principles to the commercial sphere to 
explain how concerns over the commercial speech doctrine are separate from 
those regarding Lochnerism’s economic substantive due process. 
A. The First Amendment’s Limited Scope 
The First Amendment draws a line between purely communicative 
speech and conduct that goes beyond those limits.164 Indeed, when speech is 
intertwined with conduct, it is deemed a “speech act” that is not entitled to 
First Amendment coverage.165 For instance, words communicated in the act 
of firing someone do not constitute “free speech” since the firing itself entails 
the conduct-oriented effect of abrogating a contractual relationship.166 
Although such a rule may make intuitive sense here—of course the First 
Amendment should not extend to cover the legal implications of firing 
someone—the underlying rationale illuminates the true scope of “pure 
speech.” 
Professor Thomas Emerson proposes, and the Court’s doctrine largely 
seems to agree,167 that First Amendment speech should include all expression 
that has no more than an indirect impact on the legal or physical world, a 
standard reflective of the First Amendment’s principal function of 
facilitating communication.168 Expression that is motivated only by 
 
 163 See infra Part IV. 
 164 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17–18 (1970). 
 165 Shanor, supra note 10, at 194 n.250 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content 
Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13–14). 
 166 Id. 
 167 See infra notes 176–192 and accompanying text. One notable exception to this principle is 
conspiracy, where states are often too lax in determining when an “action” has taken place that transforms 
pure speech from into the act of preparing to commit the conspired crime; as it stands, conspirators can 
often be punished for merely agreeing to commit a crime without taking any action directly in furtherance 
of the crime. Martin H. Redish & Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy as Free Expression, 
76 ALB. L. REV. 697, 716 (2012–2013). 
 168 See EMERSON, supra note 164, at 18 (explaining that speech with expression as its “dominant 
element” should be protected under the First Amendment); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (discussing how the First Amendment serves “to open 
the channels of communication rather than to close them”); see also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 998 (1978) (“The key aspect distinguishing 
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persuasive efforts, then, is the sort of “free speech” valued by the First 
Amendment.169 In line with Emerson’s model, purely persuasive expression 
only has a legal or physical consequence if the third-party intermediary—the 
person targeted by the expression—is persuaded to directly bring about that 
consequence herself.170 Simply sharing one’s ideas, in other words, does not 
shape the tangible world unless other people are actually convinced. So even 
when a speaker effectively persuades others to engage in illegal conduct, she 
is protected because her expression can be extricated from whatever effect 
ultimately results.171 
But when expression is part and parcel of conduct that goes beyond 
persuasion and directly affects the physical world, it is not afforded First 
Amendment armor. For instance, whereas someone asking her friend to give 
her money would qualify as pure speech, pointing a gun at her friend’s head 
and asking for money would fall outside the First Amendment’s scope.172 In 
the second scenario, the speaker serves as an agent in the action, meaning 
she crosses the line between speech and conduct.173 Her expression, although 
still technically speech, has evolved into an effort to forcefully coerce 
another through a physical threat, which does not comport with the First 
Amendment’s limited scope of sharing ideas in an effort to convince 
others.174 So the determinant factor in considering First Amendment 
coverage is whether the expression is self-executing such that it directly 
causes a tangible shift in the physical or legal realm.175 If so, the expression 
is not protected by the First Amendment and is subject to regulation. 
 
harms caused by protected speech acts from most other methods of causing harms is that speech harms 
occur only to the extent people ‘mentally’ adopt perceptions or attitudes.” (emphasis added)). It should 
be noted that this construal of “free speech” can entail both verbal and nonverbal expression. See infra 
notes 181–186 and accompanying text. 
 169 See EMERSON, supra note 164, at 18; David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of 
Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 342 (1991) (noting that the “persuasion principle” serves to limit 
the scope of governmental regulation). 
 170 See EMERSON, supra note 164, at 404–05. 
 171 Id. at 405 (noting that, if the conduct is illegal, “the community must satisfy itself with punishment 
of the one who [acted],” not the one who only “communicated with him about it.”); see also infra note 
187 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s rule that incitement of unlawful conduct can be 
considered unprotected speech if it is directly proximate to the unlawful conduct itself). 
 172 Cf. Martin H. Redish & Matthew Fisher, Terrorizing Advocacy and the First Amendment: Free 
Expression and the Fallacy of Mutual Exclusivity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 574 (2017) (making a 
similar comparison using a mugger demanding that the victim give him her money). 
 173 EMERSON, supra note 164, at 404. 
 174 Baker, supra note 168, at 998 (“The reasons why speech is protected do not apply if the speaker 
coerces the other or physically interferes with the other’s rights.”). 
 175 See Strauss, supra note 169, at 343 (explaining the line the government must draw between efforts 
to persuade and efforts to solely injure through expression); see also Baker, supra note 168, at 997–98; 
Comment, Coercion, Blackmail, and the Limits of Protected Speech, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1471 
(1983). 
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The Court enforces this distinction in the context of symbolic political 
speech. For example, United States v. O’Brien concerned a law that 
prohibited the destruction of draft cards, which had been implicated when 
O’Brien burned his own card in protest of the Vietnam War.176 In determining 
how to apply the First Amendment, the Court considered whether the 
regulation targeted purely persuasive expression or expression intertwined 
with a tangible, and therefore regulable, action.177 Here, the Court concluded 
that the regulation served to ensure the smooth functioning of the Selective 
Service System.178 O’Brien’s expression thus went beyond persuasive 
purposes; instead, it directly impacted his legal relationship with the 
Selective Service.179 Accordingly, the Court held that the First Amendment 
did not afford him protection.180 
Conversely, the Court in Texas v. Johnson181 found no such element of 
intertwined conduct. There, the Court examined a flag-burning statute that 
Johnson had violated when he burned a United States flag during a political 
rally.182 The Court concluded that, despite Johnson’s lack of spoken words, 
the regulation targeted Johnson’s “speech” precisely because of its 
persuasive nature and nothing more.183 The Court dismissed fears that the 
expression may have been offensive or might have convinced witnesses that 
national unity has been undermined as insufficient reasons to bypass the First 
Amendment.184 Those rationales, in fact, justified invoking the free speech 
doctrine in the first place—otherwise new, societally challenging ideas 
 
 176 391 U.S. 367, 369–70 (1968). The Court conceded that the act certainly had some expressive 
value but was still unwilling to extend it First Amendment protection on those grounds alone. Id. at 376. 
 177 Id. at 377 (listing amongst the requirements for a permissible regulation that it be “unrelated to 
the suppression of free expression” and, in the event of an “incidental” First Amendment impact, that it 
be “no greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the government’s] interest”). 
 178 Id. at 378–80 (determining that the maintenance of draft cards is essential to the operation of the 
Selective Service). 
 179 Id. at 382 (“When O’Brien deliberately rendered unavailable his registration certificate, he 
wilfully [sic] frustrated this governmental interest [of effectively running the Selective Service]. For this 
noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else, he was convicted.”). 
 180 Id. at 386. Emerson notably disagrees with the Court’s conclusion about the purpose of the law 
in O’Brien. EMERSON, supra note 164, at 84–87 (arguing that a different legislative scheme already 
contemplated the unexpressive element of O’Brien’s conduct—hindering the draft process—meaning this 
set of legislation must have specifically targeted the expression inherent in burning draft cards). Still, to 
the extent O’Brien’s test can be extricated from its particular fact pattern, it provides helpful guidance for 
drawing the line between speech and conduct. See infra notes 181–186 and accompanying text. 
 181 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 182 Id. at 399–400. 
 183 Id. at 407. 
 184 Id. at 407–10. 
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would be too easily stifled by majoritarian forces.185 So because there was no 
indication that burning a flag itself has a direct impact on any legal structures, 
the Court classified Johnson’s expression as pure speech and protected it 
under the First Amendment.186 
The Court runs into a similar issue when it comes to people who openly 
advocate for the commission of a crime: should the speaker be suppressed 
for fear she will manage to convince others to follow through with her 
suggestion, or is her expression protected by the First Amendment? In 
resolving that conundrum, the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio crafted an 
“imminent lawless action” test, wherein expression can only be suppressed 
if it is likely to immediately bring about the relevant unlawful activity.187 The 
First Amendment thus does not protect expression that is made in 
“imminent” preparation of a crime, whereas even the most radical expression 
that is minimally tangential to a crime falls within the First Amendment’s 
ambit.188 That small but crucial distinction allows the Court to appropriately 
parse through statements that act as mere propositions to engage in illegal 
conduct—persuasive expression that merits constitutional protection—and 
expression that is tightly woven into the illegal conduct itself, thereby losing 
its “pure speech” qualities.189 
Accordingly, under Brandenburg, turning to a fellow revolutionary at 
the precipice of a violent governmental overthrow and shouting that they 
shoot someone would constitute an unprotected form of conduct, given its 
proximity to the unlawful act.190 But on the other hand, passing out pamphlets 
 
 185 Id. at 414 (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable.”); id. at 415 (“[N]othing in our precedents suggests that a State may foster its 
own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it.”). 
 186 Id. at 420 (reasoning that in upholding Johnson’s right to free speech, the Court was conveying 
the true meaning of the American flag). 
 187 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (explaining that the First Amendment only applies against advocacy 
for unlawful activity if the speech “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action”). But see EMERSON, supra note 164, at 75 (arguing that 
“incitement” is inherent in all speech, meaning that the Brandenburg standard is too broad). Brandenburg 
involved a member of the Ku Klux Klan convicted under an Ohio law for his speech at a rally. 395 U.S. 
at 445–47. The Court ultimately held that the Ohio law was too broad to pass muster under the First 
Amendment. Id. at 449 (“[W]e are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as applied, 
purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others 
merely to advocate the described type of action.”). 
 188 Redish & Fisher, supra note 172, at 572. 
 189 See id. at 572–73. 
 190 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376–77 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, J.J., concurring) 
(laying the groundwork for the Brandenburg test by reasoning that the First Amendment can only be 
eschewed when “immediate serious violence [is] to expected” and, along those lines, noting “[o]nly an 
emergency can justify repression”), overruled in part by Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444. 
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that do nothing more than propose gruesome societal upheaval would receive 
all the benefits associated with the First Amendment. Simply spreading ideas 
is not inexorably intertwined with the execution of those ideas; the speaker 
is expressing herself, not engaging in any tangible conduct aimed at directly 
shaping the world around her.191 And although some may argue that the 
legislature’s ability to regulate unlawful conduct necessarily implies its 
ability to also regulate speech associated with that conduct, such a stance is 
an oversimplification of the First Amendment. The government has more 
capacity to regulate what people actually do than how they think and express 
themselves.192 
The ultimate demarcation between speech and conduct, then, lies in the 
purpose of the expression. If the speaker means to persuade another to action, 
only indirectly changing the physical or legal world, the expression is pure 
speech, which implicates the First Amendment. But if the speaker aims to 
directly impact those realms—meaning the expression itself affects the 
physical or legal world—an element of conduct is invoked, and the First 
Amendment does not apply.193 Therefore, the key to a speaker obtaining 
protection under the First Amendment is that her only intention be to 
persuade another to action; once she engages in expression that directly 
effectuates some other purpose, First Amendment coverage is no longer 
available. 
B. Identifying Pure Speech in the Commercial Sphere 
The necessity of differentiating between speech and conduct under the 
First Amendment makes the invocation of Lochner misleading in the context 
of the commercial speech doctrine. In line with the First Amendment’s focus 
on pure speech, the protections for commercial speech must extend to solely 
 
 191 Cf. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106–08 (1973) (holding that saying “[w]e’ll take the fucking 
street later” in response to police presence at a political rally is protected speech because it is “nothing 
more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time”). 
 192 Strauss, supra note 169, at 342 (concluding that the First Amendment prevents the government 
from regulating speech simply due to the fear that it will prove to be too influential). This same principle 
is reflected in Virginia State Board’s rationale that the legislature cannot deny people access to 
commercial speech out of paternalistic concerns over the speech’s persuasive effect. Supra notes 115–
120 and accompanying text. 
 193 It is for that reason that Professor David Strauss argues to exclude workplace harassment from 
First Amendment coverage: because such expression is not aimed at convincing an intermediary but is 
instead spoken in insular contexts with the primary intent to directly harm the victim, it does not merit 
“free speech” status. Strauss, supra note 169, at 343; cf. Redish & Fisher, supra note 172, at 574 (“Simply 
put, a true threat is a coercive act, not speech. The First Amendment does not protect every use of words. 
It protects the right of the speaker to voluntarily express herself in order to persuade a willing listener to 
adopt a certain belief or take a certain action.”). On the other hand, “defamation or speech that induces a 
hostile audience reaction” falls more in line with Professor Strauss’s persuasion principle since it is 
ostensibly aimed at convincing members of the crowd. Strauss, supra note 169, at 343. 
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persuasive efforts194—as in, efforts to convince others to enter into economic 
engagements, most notably through advertisements.195 Alternatively, the 
right to contract directly affects the legal realm since contracts create 
binding, legal obligations between parties. In other words, whereas 
commercial speech is aimed at convincing potential consumers to act on their 
own behalf, contracts serve as transactions in and of themselves; contracts 
are the objects, not the means, of persuasion. Thus, the two doctrines 
implicate entirely different portions of the overarching marketplace. 
That crucial distinction effectively undermines any assertions that the 
commercial speech doctrine will ever become a new version of the right to 
contract. The First Amendment is focused on allowing people to convince 
others to undertake certain actions or beliefs by keeping the channels of 
communication free from governmental interference.196 But there is no such 
persuasive communication occurring at the time of contract formation since, 
by that point, the listener has already been convinced to enter into an 
economic transaction. And conversely, a listener is not forced to directly 
alter her legal status by simply reading an advertisement. A commercial 
speaker therefore only has an indirect impact on legal relationships; no legal 
shift occurs until the listeners take action on their own behalves. 
Accordingly, so long as the First Amendment’s protection requires that a 
speaker is persuading her listener and nothing more, an expanded 
commercial speech doctrine is simply not equipped to reinvigorate 
Lochnerism.197 
As a result of their unique foundational bases, each doctrine has a 
distinct impact on the legislature’s ability to enact laws regarding the 
marketplace. The right to contract, in fact, conflicts with direct mandates 
from the legislature,198 which are regulatory methodologies the First 
Amendment would never touch.199 That is, if Congress wants to restrain a 
particular economic transaction, the First Amendment leaves open the 
opportunity to ban that conduct altogether: the commercial speech doctrine 
 
 194 See supra Section III.A. 
 195 Supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 196 Supra notes 164–175 and accompanying text. 
 197 To the extent commercial speakers are protected against discrimination under the First 
Amendment, that doctrine still only affects discriminatory laws, whereas the right to contract affected 
every law—discriminatory or not—that interfered with a contractual relationship. See infra notes 213–
221 and accompanying text. 
 198 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905) (describing New York’s law as “an 
absolute prohibition upon the employer, permitting, under any circumstances, more than ten hours work 
to be done in his establishment”). 
 199 Shanor, supra note 10, at 198 (“Where constitutional barriers prevent such ‘lighter-touch’ 
regulation [referring to regulations that tend to be more speech-oriented], mandates may be the most 
feasible regulatory response.”). 
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is not concerned with economic transactions themselves but rather the ability 
to propose them to listeners.200 Throughout the Lochner Era, however, the 
fate of direct mandates was entirely subject to the Court’s discretion; the 
right to contract prevented the legislature from outright prohibiting certain 
provisions in an economic relationship.201 In line with the imminent lawless 
action test, then, the First Amendment protects the ability to advocate for an 
economic transaction, even if the transaction itself is illegal. On the other 
hand, the Lochner line of cases would protect the transaction, but not any 
related advocacy for the transaction—the right to contract only acts once 
there is a tangible contract in place. 
In that sense, the First Amendment might be construed as having even 
more impactful regulatory implications than Lochnerism ever did.202 Without 
a free speech protection, regulations could restrict the information available 
in the public sphere, thereby surreptitiously influencing people’s perceptions 
and insulating companies’ activities from public scrutiny. But in a world 
without the right to contract, information continues to flow freely, so the 
people can still accurately decide how they want to regulate certain economic 
transactions through the political branches. Each doctrine’s respective focus 
is thus molded accordingly: whereas the Lochner Era’s concerns pertained 
to the legislature preventing people from acting a certain way, the First 
Amendment is concerned with the legislature preventing people from talking 
and thinking in a certain way.203 Consequently, economic substantive due 
 
 200 Sorrell emphasizes this point by stating that a regulation must have more than an “incidental” 
impact on speech before the First Amendment intervenes. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 
(2011). 
 201 See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down a direct mandate against 
contracts that prohibited employees from joining unions), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. 
N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
 202 Cf. supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing why the legislature’s greater ability to 
regulate unlawful conduct does not include the lesser ability  to regulate speech associated with that 
conduct in regard to the imminent lawless action test). Justice Black in particular recognized the 
importance of facilitating the free communication of ideas through the First Amendment, writing that its 
protections hold a “preferred place” in democratic societies. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 
(1951) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 203 See supra note 192 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text 
(discussing Virginia State Board’s rationale for extending constitutional protection to commercial 
speech); 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502–03 (1996) (discussing how regulations 
of truthful commercial speech “hinder customer choice” and also “impede debate over central issues of 
public policy”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 579 
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If a governmental unit believes that use or overuse 
of air conditioning is a serious problem, it must attack that problem directly, by prohibiting air 
conditioning or regulating thermostat levels. . . . [It] may not promote energy conservation ‘by keeping 
the public in ignorance.’” (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976))). 
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process is necessarily aimed at restricting a class of regulations entirely 
separate from the First Amendment. 
For instance, the Court in Lochner could not have reached the same 
holding had it relied on the First Amendment instead of the right to contract. 
The law there mandated a maximum number of working hours for New York 
bakers, which voided the contractual relationship the plaintiff had 
established with his own employees.204 That contract entailed no attempts at 
persuading a listener to action; rather, it self-executed so as to form a legal 
relationship between employer and employee. Any law regulating such a 
contract is beyond the reach of the First Amendment because, despite 
speech’s literal presence in the contract itself,205 the language therein is being 
utilized to directly impact the parties’ legal duties. In fact, the Court pointed 
to that tangible effect in justifying its deployment of the right to contract to 
strike down the regulation.206 
Similarly, in Coppage v. Kansas, a case emblematic of the Lochner Era, 
the Court struck down a regulation that prohibited employers from 
implementing contracts with explicit restrictions on their employees’ 
capacity to join a union.207 Again, the regulated expression there—the 
original contract—went beyond pure speech by creating binding, legal 
obligations between the parties. That conduct-oriented purpose, however, 
did not preclude the application of the right to contract. Indeed, the Court 
only intervened with the Due Process Clause because the regulated 
transaction was intrinsically, and in the Court’s view, unfairly, conduct-
oriented.208 The right to contract thus served as a means to reach regulations 
that would otherwise be untouched by the enumerated provisions in the Bill 
of Rights, including the First Amendment’s promise of free speech; because 
the Constitution had not provided a right through which the Court could 
 
 204 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905) (discussing how, under the New York law, Lochner 
had “wrongfully and unlawfully required and permitted an employé working for him to work more than 
sixty hours in one week”). 
 205 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 206 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (“The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected 
by [the Fourteenth Amendment].” (emphasis added)). 
 207 236 U.S. 1, 16 (1914), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) 
(“The Act . . . is intended to deprive employers of a part of their liberty of contract, to the corresponding 
advantage of the employed and the upbuilding of the labor organizations.”). 
 208 See id. at 18–19 (“[I]n our opinion, the Fourteenth Amendment debars the States from striking 
down personal liberty or property rights, or materially restricting their normal exercise, excepting so far 
as may be incidentally necessary for the accomplishment of some other and paramount object, and one 
that concerns the public welfare.”). 
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enforce its preferred policies, the Court had to invent a new right 
altogether.209 
Commercial speech cases, too, serve to distinguish between 
Lochnerism and the First Amendment: were the right to contract the Court’s 
only tool in those fact patterns, it would have been unable to overturn 
regulations that restrict pure speech. In Virginia State Board, the Court 
considered a regulation that punished physicians who advertised the price of 
prescription-only drugs.210 Unlike the Lochnerian cases, the expression here 
was purely persuasive in that it did not directly affect the physical or legal 
world but instead focused on convincing third-party consumers to do so for 
themselves. There was, after all, no contract or other direct action involved 
unless and until the expression proved successful in persuading the listeners 
to purchase the advertising physician’s products. 211 The right to contract 
would therefore provide no foothold to justify safeguarding the regulated 
speech. Instead, the Court considered this persuasive expression to be exactly 
the sort valued under the First Amendment and accordingly invoked the 
protection of free speech in striking down the law.212 
Even Sorrell v. IMS Health, often cited as an egregious contemporary 
expansion of commercial speech,213 does not implicate the same concerns as 
Lochnerism. Sorrell struck down a regulation that prohibited pharmacies 
from selling individual doctors’ prescription information for marketing 
purposes.214 At first blush, such a law may appear to be conduct-regulating 
in that it outright proscribed a transaction—the sale of data—thus suggesting 
 
 209 See supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of natural rights 
theories). 
 210 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 752 (1976). 
 211 See id. at 762 (discussing “the transaction that is proposed in the commercial advertisement” 
(emphasis added)). 
 212 Id. at 770 (stating that, although Virginia can regulate the pharmaceutical industries through more 
direct means, the First Amendment prohibits it from “do[ing] so by keeping the public in ignorance of 
the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering”). 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island 
provides a further illustration of a commercial speech case that could not be replicated through the right 
to contract. 517 U.S. 484 (1996). The law at issue in that case was a regulation that significantly limited 
the capacity of liquor companies to advertise the prices of their products. Id. at 489–90. Such a law does 
not target any contract or other form of direct impact on legal statuses; rather, the regulated speech was 
aimed solely at convincing consumers to purchase the speakers’ products. See id. And because that 
formulation does not comport with the tangible effects covered by the right to contract, the Court invoked 
the First Amendment to protect people’s access to purely persuasive expression, commercial or not, citing 
the fact that regulations of truthful commercial speech “hinder customer choice” and “impede debate over 
central issues of public policy.” Id. at 502–03, 508. Indeed, the regulation at hand reflected the specific 
paternalism concerns inherent in the First Amendment, not the right to contract—namely those regarding 
the government’s efforts to insulate its genuine public policy from the people. Id. 
 213 See supra notes 136–139 (discussing Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Sorrell). 
 214 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). 
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it would be better analyzed under the right to contract than the First 
Amendment.215 But in reality, the Sorrell decision had nothing to do with the 
distinction between speech and conduct. Rather, it was predicated on an 
entirely distinct concept under the First Amendment: the protection against 
discrimination.216 Crucially, the law at issue in Sorrell only targeted the use 
of prescription data in companies’ marketing efforts without at all burdening 
noncommercial speakers’ use of that same data.217 Such a regulation is akin 
to, for example, a law allowing Republicans to purchase paper for their 
informational pamphlets but preventing Democrats from doing so.218 
Accordingly, the Sorrell law exemplified speaker-based discrimination 
in that it targeted only certain speakers—those seeking to sell prescription 
drugs—based on nothing more than the speakers’ commercial identity, and 
that defect is what led the Sorrell Court to its holding.219 In other words, the 
decision had nothing to do with an expanded definition of speech in the 
commercial context.220 Comparisons to Lochner, therefore, are unfounded 
because economic substantive due process could undermine any regulation 
affecting contractual relationships, irrespective of whether the regulations 
discriminated against a specific group.221 Indeed, the only change that could 
truly revitalize Lochnerism under the First Amendment is stretching the 
definition of commercial speech so it includes non-persuasive conduct. 
Sorrell did nothing of the sort. 
Ultimately, then, economic substantive due process and the commercial 
speech doctrine target wholly distinct regulatory approaches that do not 
 
 215 But see id. at 570 (contesting Vermont’s argument that its law was conduct-regulating because 
“the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment”). 
 216 See Agatha M. Cole, Internet Advertising after Sorrell v. IMS Health: A Discussion on Data 
Privacy & the First Amendment, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283, 303 (2012) (discussing the Court’s 
holding in the context of discriminatory principles). 
 217 See supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Court suggested that, had the law 
been applied more expansively to all speakers, it is possible the First Amendment would not have been 
implicated in the first place. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571 (noting that the case turned on the content-
discriminatory effects of the law, regardless of whether the sale of information qualified as “speech”). 
 218 Cf. id. (“So long as they do not engage in marketing, many speakers can obtain and use the 
information. But detailers cannot. Vermont’s statute could be compared with a law prohibiting trade 
magazines from purchasing or using ink.”). 
 219 Id. at 564. 
 220 Although the sale of prescription information was not necessarily speech itself, the Court 
concluded that to restrict that sale would be to pose more than an incidental burden on speech, which is 
enough to subject the law to the First Amendment. Id. at 567. In this case, the burdened speech was the 
eventual marketing toward certain doctors that was based, in large part, on the company’s access to 
prescriber information. See id. at 558. 
 221 Still, there is no denying that the application of speaker-discriminatory principles to protect 
commercial speakers will impact the regulatory schema permissible under the First Amendment. See infra 
note 242 and accompanying text. 
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overlap beyond their economic nature. And that distinction between the 
doctrines should hardly be surprising—it bears emphasizing that the First 
Amendment and Due Process Clause are not constitutionally linked 
whatsoever and, consequently, have wholly unique focuses.222 Accordingly, 
striking down a law that prohibits employers from firing workers due to their 
union membership223 or provides women with a minimum wage224 differs not 
in degree, but in kind, from rejecting regulations that restrict an employer’s 
capacity to advertise her business225 or prevent pharmaceutical companies, 
and nobody else, from engaging in certain speech.226 This demarcation brings 
to light the problems that result from forcing Lochnerism into First 
Amendment debates. 
IV. THE TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS OF EXPLOITING LOCHNER 
Lochnerism and commercial speech are distinct doctrines, but the 
consistent conflation of the two227 has effectively muddled the line between 
them. Concededly, there is something appealing about the notion that both 
doctrines can be weaponized to protect economic interests; it makes for a 
compelling narrative and conveniently grounds the growing commercial 
speech doctrine in familiar terms. But Lochner is too potent to be so 
recklessly injected into discussions of First Amendment issues. Lochnerism 
today signifies an untethered, unprincipled judiciary, and scholars and 
Supreme Court Justices have subsequently pressed that widely condemned 
image228 into the fabric of the commercial speech doctrine. Regardless of the 
actual propriety of granting commercial speech full constitutional 
protection—a tricky question that continues to garner considerable 
 
 222 See supra notes 202–203 and accompanying text (discussing the different paternalism concerns 
inherent in each doctrine). 
 223  Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 16 (1914), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp., 313 U.S. 
177 (1941); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. 
N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941);  
 224 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by W. Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 225 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 226 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 227 See supra Part II (discussing Justices’ and scholars’ comparisons between the two doctrines). 
 228 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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debate229—the recent expansions to the doctrine are not nearly as 
revolutionary as the parade of horribles the label of Lochnerism suggests.230 
In reality, it is safe to say that deploying the First Amendment to protect 
commercial speech simply does not enable Lochnerian levels of judicial 
overreach.231 Inevitably, when interpreting “free speech,” the Court will need 
to exercise some discretion over what types of expression the First 
Amendment covers; like many constitutional provisions,232 the proper 
application of the First Amendment is not always perfectly clear.233 Texas v. 
Johnson, for instance, did not entail speech at all, just the symbolic act of 
burning a flag.234 Still, few would argue that the Court outright abandoned 
the boundaries of the First Amendment in protecting that expression: the law 
in Johnson was designed precisely to burden the persuasive, communicative 
component of the act of burning the flag, making it well-suited for the 
constitutional protection of “free speech.”235 
Ostensibly, commercial speech is an even better fit under the First 
Amendment than the burning of a flag. Commercial speech generally entails 
actual speech, unaccompanied by a corresponding action, that is purely 
persuasive—most notably, advertisements meant to persuade others to 
purchase. Such an expression falls in line with other forms of speech that 
receive unquestioned protection, like political campaigning during an 
election.236 Consequently, the Court does not indisputably abandon its 
constitutional boundaries in construing “free speech” as wholly protecting 
commercial speech; that interpretation could be justified as a reasonable, and 
 
 229 Supra note 36 and accompanying text (comparing the approach Professor Robert Post takes in 
disfavoring the commercial speech doctrine to Professor Martin Redish and Abby Mollen’s argument that 
the First Amendment must logically include commercial speech). 
 230 Professor Shanor makes a similar point at the end of her Article. Shanor, supra note 10, at 193 
(“[D]espite the First Amendment’s deregulatory potential, it is highly unlikely.”). 
 231 See supra Section I.B (discussing the inherent flaws of economic substantive due process). 
 232 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (emphasizing that procedural due 
process is a context-oriented right whose protections turn on the “governmental and private interests” that 
are affected in that specific case). 
 233 Although it may be somewhat ambiguous, the “free speech” guarantee in the First Amendment 
provides significantly more guidance than does the “privileges or immunities” language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see supra notes 98–100 (discussing the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a potential 
alternative grounding for the right to contract); whereas the latter has limitless potential, the former is at 
least restricted to issues concerning expression. 
 234 491 U.S. 397, 399–400 (1989). 
 235 See supra notes 181–186 and accompanying text. 
 236 Indeed, even Professor Robert Post, who opposes full protection of the commercial speech 
doctrine, would afford it some level of First Amendment value. Post, supra note 36, 4 (“Commercial 
speech differs from public discourse because it is constitutionally valued merely for the information it 
disseminates, rather than for being a valuable way of participating in democratic self-determination.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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even proper, reading of the First Amendment. The tie between commercial 
speech and the First Amendment is thus stronger than any connection 
between Lochner’s right to contract and the Due Process Clause.237 As Justice 
Kennedy put it in Sorrell: “The Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statics. It does enact the First Amendment.”238 Therefore, 
comparing commercial speech to Lochnerism is not only misguided but also 
unfair since the argument for constitutionalizing commercial speech is, on 
its face, far more sound than any argument for constitutionalizing the right 
to contract.239 
This Note, however, does not insist that the First Amendment must 
necessarily cover commercial speech, only that an analysis of the issue 
requires a discussion of First Amendment principles rather than Lochnerian 
ones. In other words, although the commercial speech doctrine can and 
should continue to be critically discussed, it should not be bluntly compared 
to Lochnerism just because both doctrines involve commercial entities and 
relationships. Whenever the jurisprudential behemoth of Lochnerism steps 
in, any analytical nuance is lost; Lochner forces scholars to assess the 
relevance of the right to contract in the context of the First Amendment, a 
task akin to fitting a square peg in a round hole.240  
Thus, in its current role, invocations of Lochner are nothing but a 
boogeyman when it comes to commercial speech. The forced comparisons 
between economic substantive due process and commercial speech can cause 
the scholarship to lose sight of the legitimate concerns surrounding the First 
Amendment, instead homing in on its supposed Lochnerian characteristics.241 
That tendency is dangerously misrepresentative of both doctrines and 
effectively stalls progress in the burgeoning, important field of commercial 
speech scholarship. And certainly, there are issues left to be resolved here. 
 
 237 See supra Section I.B. 
 238 Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 239 Of course, there are many arguments regarding the constitutionality of commercial speech that 
are beyond the scope of this Note. For more thorough discussions of those principles, see generally Post, 
supra note 36; Redish & Mollen, supra note 36. 
 240 For example, that Professor Shanor goes so far as to bring up “speech as such”—the notion that 
any form of expression, regardless of its accompanying conduct, could feasibly be protected under the 
First Amendment, Shanor, supra note 10, at 199—shows just how far scholars have strayed from the core 
tenets of the First Amendment. “Speech as such” is a constitutional absurdity; the day the Court accepts 
such an approach is the day the right to free speech has swallowed any and all human conduct, and at that 
point, there will be no way to govern society, much less regulate advertising. See id. at 176 (“Just as most 
conduct operates in whole or in part through speech, most conduct can be expressive.”). This visage, 
frightening as it may be, would require drastic doctrinal upheavals far, far beyond the recent developments 
of the commercial speech doctrine. 
 241 See supra Section II.B. 
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For instance, Professor Shanor raises a fair point when she contends that the 
Court’s application of strict scrutiny to laws discriminating against 
commercial speakers will have broad regulatory implications.242 Unlike 
Lochner, however, these are questions relating to the First Amendment, not 
economic substantive due process, and must be framed accordingly. 
Additionally, if the commercial speech doctrine is really at risk of 
reviving Lochner, that same principle must logically pose a threat in other 
First Amendment domains as well.243 For instance, in the context of 
matrimony, asking, “Will you marry me?” is similar to proposing a 
commercial transaction by advertising a product, and saying “I do” parallels 
the ultimate purchase of that product.244 Although speech is technically 
contained in both of those statements, only the latter—“I do”—has a direct 
legal impact by creating binding obligations between the parties. So if First 
Amendment protection can extend from the proposal of a transaction to also 
cover the transaction itself in the commercial sphere, would it not prevent 
the regulation of the “speech” of agreeing to marry someone? By that logic, 
states would no longer be able to regulate the binding obligations created at 
the point of marriage. 
In reality, there is no principled reason to confine concerns regarding 
an expanded First Amendment scope to the commercial context, which 
further elucidates the dangers posed by comparisons to Lochner. These 
arguments have not only created a free speech issue out of whole cloth245 but 
also illogically cabined it to the commercial sphere.246 Indeed, if an 
expanding definition of speech is really a legitimate First Amendment 
 
 242 Shanor, supra note 10, at 178 (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 566–71 (2011)). 
Specifically, Professor Shanor worries that this new standard could serve to invalidate all mandated 
disclosures, like warnings on cigarettes, because such regulations technically single out commercial 
speech based solely on the speaker’s identity. Id. (“By definition, all mandatory disclosures require some 
defined class to say something rather than something else. Were this contention accepted, every mandated 
disclosure would be subject to searching constitutional review.”). She also lists fraudulent and 
demonstrably false speech as protected under this holding since they too are regulated purely on the basis 
of the content of the speech. Id. But cf. Samp, supra note 134, at 136–39 (listing laws regarding 
misrepresentative speech, speech that is false or proposes criminal activities, and privacy as the types of 
regulations that will probably be unaffected by Sorrell’s holding). Indeed, her point seems especially 
salient given that compelled disclosures are a prominent example of lighter-touch regulations, which are 
becoming increasingly prevalent and tend to be more speech-oriented. See supra note 156 and 
accompanying text. 
 243 Shanor, supra note 10, at 177 (acknowledging that given her speech as such approach, “almost 
all regulation is or could be understood to regulate speech or expression”). Indeed, Professor Shanor does 
not shy away from this point, noting that even events like 9/11 could theoretically be construed as falling 
within the broadest definition of the First Amendment. Id. at 176. 
 244 See, e.g., United States v. Li, No. CV-12-00482-PHX-DGC, 2014 WL 4220853, at *4 (D. Ariz. 
Aug. 26, 2014) (describing the process of making a marriage legal). 
 245 See supra Section III.B. 
 246 See supra notes 243–244 and accompanying text. 
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concern, it is even more imperative that the comparisons to Lochnerism 
cease so that scholarship is forced to look beyond the commercial speech 
doctrine to examine all areas where speech is present. Put another way, free 
speech is a broader issue than Lochner. Overlooking that fact unduly 
constrains important discussions about the First Amendment’s role in a 
democratic society. 
CONCLUSION 
The commercial speech doctrine is not Lochner, no matter how 
persistently the two are compared. In reality, the First Amendment’s well-
established doctrinal lines do not stretch beyond purely persuasive, 
communicative expression, which effectively prevents it from ever 
protecting the conduct that historically implicated Lochner’s right to 
contract. Bringing Lochner into the realm of commercial speech therefore 
does not provide any clarity but only obscures a relatively new and 
undoubtedly important issue. As such, this Note draws a line between the 
two doctrines. Once the scholarship recognizes that commercial speech is its 
own entity with its own particular concerns, discussion and debate about that 
doctrine can move forward in a productive way. Moreover, diverting 
attention away from commercial speech will refocus discussion on the 
ongoing attempts by certain scholars to revive Lochner on its own terms—
that is, not through the First Amendment, but a theory of natural rights.247 
Each doctrine thus requires the scholarship’s full and focused attention, 
which will be impossible so long as Lochner continues to haunt the halls of 
the First Amendment. 
  
 
 247 See supra notes 95–103 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Barnett’s theories). For a 
more elaborate discussion of the potential return of Lochner in something akin to its original form, see 
generally, Colby & Smith, supra note 49. 
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